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This paper presents the autonomy movement of Voivodina, what has been achieved
so far and why the pre-1990 autonomy could not have been attained. The Hungari-
ans of Voivodina have traditionally been enthusiastic supporters of provincial au-
tonomy despite the fact that Voivodina’s autonomy is not a kind of ethnic auton-
omy. This issue will be explored through a focus on the case of the Hungarian mi-
nority and the ways in which the autonomy of Voivodina benefits ethnic minorities.
I will demonstrate that the current powers of provincial institutions have been suffi-
cient to implement minority rights in Voivodina better than in the rest of Serbia, yet
were not enough to prevent inter-ethnic incidents. I will also consider why provin-
cial authorities could be better trusted regarding minority protection than the central
government, including in dealing with future ethnic violence.
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The province of Voivodina, situated in the North of Serbia on the border with
Hungary and Romania, has been throughout most of its history famous for its mul-
tiethnic character and the lack of serious ethnic tensions. Voivodina traditionally
has been home to more than twenty different nationalities, among which the Hun-
garians, Slovaks, Croats, Montenegrins and Romanians are the most numerous af-
ter the Serbian majority, which as of today constitutes around two thirds of the
province’s population.1 Voivodina also had a historic legacy distinct from that of
the rest of Serbia, as until World War I it was part of the Austro-Hungarian Mon-
archy, while the rest of the country was under Ottoman rule until the end of the
19th century. In addition, Voivodina belonged to the group of so-called developed
regions in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, being the third most de-
veloped federal unit after Slovenia and Croatia if measured by regional GDP per
capita, and the most developed region of the latter Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
comprised of Serbia and Montenegro.2 Before 1989 Voivodina enjoyed far reach-
ing autonomy, which was stripped away by Miloševih; its status was similar to
that of the republics in the former Yugoslavia. Since the democratic changes in
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2000 some of the previous competencies were reinstated, in particular by the so-
called Omnibus Law in 2002. However, the pre-1989 autonomy has not been re-
stored and cannot be expected to be restored any time soon. Hopes regarding more
autonomy have vanished for the moment following the adoption of the new Ser-
bian constitution in 2006.
Ethnic minorities have traditionally been enthusiastic supporters of provincial
autonomy, despite the fact that Voivodina’s autonomy is not a kind of ethnic au-
tonomy, and has always been led by local Serbs. Provincial autonomy in itself
does not even grant special political representation for minorities, as there are no
reserved seats guaranteed for them in the provincial assembly in proportion to
their percentage of the population. Furthermore, Voivodina’s autonomy could not
function as a substitute for any kind of ethnic autonomy given that even the largest
minority community, the Hungarians, makes up only 14% of the province’s popu-
lation. However, the political autonomy of Voivodina became one of the five fun-
damental pillars of the Hungarians’ autonomy-model, in addition to personal, eth-
nic-territorial, political and municipal autonomy.3 This indicates that Hungarians
consider provincial autonomy a means of guaranteeing their minority rights. The
question arises why exactly Voivodina’s autonomy is favored by minorities. I will
address this question by focusing on the case of the Hungarian minority and the
ways in which Voivodina’s autonomy benefits ethnic minorities. This discussion
will demonstrate that even though minorities in Voivodina are in a privileged po-
sition compared to other groups living in the rest of Serbia, such as the Albanians
in the Preševo valley or the Bosniaks in Sandzak, Voivodina’s minority-protec-
tion regimes also have their limits, which particularly manifested themselves dur-
ing the inter-ethnic incidents in 2003 and 2004. I will therefore also offer an ex-
planation as to why strengthening provincial autonomy would be desirable from
the point of view of preventing future ethnic violence. First, however, I offer a
short discussion introducing the history of the movement for autonomy in
Voivodina.
A Brief History of the Movement for Autonomy
The contemporary movement for the autonomy of Voivodina was born in the
early 1990s. It grew out of the lost autonomy the province had enjoyed before
1989.4 The Yugoslav constitution of 1974 endowed the federal units (the repub-
lics and provinces) with far-reaching legislative, executive and judicial rights:
they had their own parliament and ministries, were able to ratify their own consti-
tution, and had control over education, economic and social welfare policies.
Since Serbia had two autonomous provinces, Voivodina and Kosovo (and as such
was unique among the Yugoslav republics), a peculiar situation emerged in which
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Serbia could not amend its own constitution without the consent of its provinces,
while the latter were able to alter their own constitutions without the consent of
Serbia.5 Furthermore, in the federal bodies the provinces could veto the decisions
of the Serbian authorities. Individual republics and provinces also gained consid-
erable economic autonomy, especially with regards to fiscal policy, including de-
fining credit conditions.6 As a result, national grievances were on the rise in Serbia
from the early 1980s over the growing sovereignty of the provinces, which started
to behave more and more like “states within the state.”7
In 1988, Miloševih forced the provincial leaderships to resign and practically
abolished Voivodina’s and Kosovo’s autonomy, an edict which was enshrined in
the new Serbian constitution adopted in September 1990. The provinces lost most
of their legislative, executive and judicial powers, and their right to veto constitu-
tional changes in Serbia.8 Thus, Miloševih effectively centralized Serbia and re-
sponded to Serbian concerns over the fragmentation of the Serbian nation in Yu-
goslavia.
In the early 1990s regional parties began to be formed that sought the restora-
tion of autonomy. They called for the reinstatement of institutions supporting eth-
nic and cultural diversity and demanded the return of the previously held political
and economic competencies. The most significant autonomist parties, the Re-
formist Democratic Party of Voivodina (the Reformists), the League of Social
Democrats of Voivodina (LSDV), and the Alliance of Voivodinian Hungarians
(AVH), emerged mostly from the dismissed or marginalized provincial political
and cultural elites.
By now autonomist political groups have been trying to mobilize people for al-
most two decades without much success. It is surprising the extent to which these
parties have failed to win public support from the early 1990s until recently, indi-
cated by their poor performance during elections. The question as to why this has
been the case throughout this period is especially puzzling since according to
available opinion polls Voivodina’s autonomy has been supported by the majority
of its population, regardless of the arrival of nearly 200,000 Serbian refugees from
other parts of former Yugoslavia. A survey of the SKAN institute from October
2003 showed that 75.5% percent of the province’s population favored cultural and
economic autonomy within Serbia, which would mean an increase in Voivodina’s
rights.9 This and previous surveys demonstrated that the majority of the popula-
tion of Voivodina’s supported improving the status of Voivodina over maintain-
ing the status quo. Although most of the time Belgrade is blamed for the lack of
progress, it will be argued here that the failure of the movement for autonomy can-
not be explained solely by the resistance of Belgrade, but also by the weakness of
autonomist parties.
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After 2000: A Lost Chance for Autonomy
After the fall of the Miloševih regime, hopes emerged for the restoration of au-
tonomy. These hopes were reinforced by the political campaign of the ‘Demo-
cratic Opposition of Serbia’ (DOS) coalition before its coming to power, since it
declared that “it will respect the need for decentralization of the state government,
with a special regard to regionalization of Serbia, affirmation of autonomy of
Voivodina and Kosovo and Metohija.”10 Despite such rhetoric, in practice the
eight years of DOS rule in the form of various coalition governments set up by its
former member parties since 2000 did not testify to a genuine commitment to de-
centralization. Carrying out the task of decentralization would have required, first
of all, the adoption of a new republican constitution, which has been continuously
postponed, with reference to plausible and less plausible excuses; as a result Ser-
bia has been essentially operating under the constitution of Miloševih until No-
vember 2006. Moreover, even though the constitution was eventually adopted, it
did not reinstate the powers Voivodina had lost, which will be explained in more
detail below.
However, it is not only the central government that is to blame for the fact that
Voivodina did not get back its extensive former rights. Any kind of solution re-
garding autonomy or regionalization has to be homegrown, meaning it has to rely
on wide public support. Unfortunately, regionalist parties so far have been unable
to mobilize sizable political support for their autonomist aspirations.
During the local elections, held in September 2004, the autonomist parties
were unable to unite in a single platform representing Voivodina. As during previ-
ous elections, their campaign wasmarked by mutual accusations and a fierce com-
petition for the title of who would be the “real” representative of the interests of
the population of Voivodina. Whereas the Alliance of Voivodina Hungarians
(AVH) stood primarily for the interests of the Hungarian minority, the other two
main autonomist parties, the League of Social Democrats of Voivodina and the
Voivodina Reformists, campaigned intensely against each other and against Bel-
grade. By 2004 their discourse had acquired a radical tone in comparison with pre-
vious elections. Economic arguments still dominated the pro-autonomy rhetoric,
yet the campaign turned increasingly negative as the parties vehemently accused
each other of incompetence and opportunism. Furthermore, their attitude towards
Belgrade could be called almost paranoid, as they repeatedly referred to vague
threats coming from the capital. The pro-autonomy discourse was considerably
more moderate during the Miloševih era even though the threat had been much
more real.11
It seems that the negative discourse and disunity among the parties was not
popular among the voters. Their electoral chances were also weakened by the fact
that during the period of 2000–2004 they were in power as members of the DOS
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coalition, but fell short of meeting their campaign promises, since autonomy re-
mained an unfulfilled wish. Consequently, in the 2004 provincial elections they
performed poorly. The Together for Voivodina coalition led by LSDV received 7
mandates, the Reformists 2, while the Hungarian party came out as the strongest
by gaining 11 seats in the provincial assembly, which was also a failure consider-
ing that the party had 17 mandates before 2004. This outcome meant that the posi-
tion of the autonomist parties weakened considerably in the institutions in
Voivodina in comparison with the preceding political term. The strongest single
party became the Serbian Radical Party with 36 mandates, yet the governing co-
alition was formed by the leadership of the Democratic Party, which won 34 seats
in the assembly.12
It should be stressed, however, that even if there has been no return to
Voivodina’s pre-1989 status, there were some steps taken towards the restoration
of autonomy. In February 2002 the republican parliament adopted the so-called
“Omnibus Law” (Law on Establishing Particular Competencies of the Autono-
mous Province), which transferred some competencies to provincial authority,
among them jurisdiction over education, labor, pensions, health care, environ-
mental issues, culture and language policy, human and minority rights, media, so-
cial services, agriculture, tourism, sport, etc. However, since the law did not grant
any legislative rights or control over finances, its success was only partial and far
from satisfying, especially in comparison with Voivodina’s standing in the former
Yugoslavia.
While the Law gave back quite a few responsibilities to Voivodina, it failed to
return any economic rights, including property rights. Voivodina did not receive
its own sources of revenue, but still depended entirely on Belgrade’s grace to
cover its expenditures, as all the funds it used were redistributed back from Bel-
grade. In practice the money was often delayed, which caused serious tensions.
Due to the delays, public services did not function properly and provincial institu-
tions provided poor quality health care, education, and other public services, also
undermining the legitimacy of the autonomy issue.13
From the autonomists’ point of view, this situation was especially frustrating in
light of the apparent development gap between Voivodina and the rest of Serbia.
Per capita national income is considerably higher in Voivodina than the Serbian
average and the province contributes considerably more to the state budget in pro-
portion to its percentage of the population.14 Foreign investors also prefer
Voivodina to the rest of the country, which indicates a generally better investment
climate.
Autonomists often point to the province’s multi-ethnic and multi-cultural char-
acter as a basis of demanding legislative and judicial rights and more economic
autonomy. They generally argue that Belgrade cannot grasp the special situation
in Voivodina and the needs that result from it. Beyond any doubt, implementing a
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multi-lingual administration itself requires a lot of money, as translators and bilin-
gual documents, signs, minority schools, etc. are expensive. Minority media can
rarely function according to free market principles, but usually need considerable
extra funding. It is a general problem that the scarcity of adequately trained teach-
ers and proper textbooks makes secondary school education especially difficult
for national minorities. Projects promoting inter-ethnic tolerance at the grass roots
level also need significant financing. All these aspects of sustaining and fostering
minority cultures and building a multi-ethnic society are generally expensive.
It should be mentioned, however, that the financial situation of the province
was somewhat improved recently, as the new Serbian constitution significantly
increased the budget of Voivodina (to at least 7% of the national budget). How-
ever, financial autonomy, meaning the province’s ability to raise its own reve-
nues, is still lacking. From the point of view of establishing financial autonomy,
the single most important measure would be to transfer state property to the pro-
vincial and local governments, which still do not have ownership rights. Since
provincial and local governments currently have the right to manage state prop-
erty, and are responsible for a number of functions, it would make sense to de-
volve to local and provincial governments the properties that are essential to their
functions.15 Property devolution is currently on the political agenda, and the law
has already been prepared by the Standing Conference of Towns and Municipali-
ties, the biggest interest organization of local governments in Serbia. Moreover,
the new Serbian constitution already recognizes the category of municipal prop-
erty and property of autonomous provinces, and asserts that the devolution of state
property will be regulated by law.16 Property transfer would be a simple and much
anticipated next step in Serbia’s administrative reform, without which one cannot
talk about real local or regional autonomy. As all Central and Eastern European
transition countries, including present EU members and countries of former Yu-
goslavia, have finished or at least initiated the process of property devolution,
there is no reasonable argument for Serbia further delaying this process.17
As provincial institutions have not been in a position to accomplish the desired
level of autonomy since the required laws have to be approved by the republican
parliament, some symbolic steps were taken in the direction of autonomy. The
constitution of Voivodina, which would endow the province with extensive rights
in all three areas of authority, was prepared to be presented in the Serbian parlia-
ment.18 The proposal included a very ambitious wish list, such as the establish-
ment of the post of president of Voivodina, a Voivodina High Court of Justice, a
two chamber provincial parliament and a Voivodinian National Bank, among oth-
ers.19 These demands have remained illusory, since the national assembly has had
enough authority to jeopardize such aspirations.
Nevertheless, highly visible, demonstrative initiatives continued, which were
expressive of aspirations for sovereignty. The province managed to set up the post
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of its own ombudsman, acquired its own label of “Made in Voivodina” on some
characteristic export products, and decided to have its own coat of arms, which
had to be used together with that of Serbia.20 The provincial parliament decided
that Novi Sad would be the capital and not merely the seat of Voivodina,21 and
adopted the flag of Voivodina.22 The intense fostering of international relations,
such as participation in Euro-regional cooperation, representation in Brussels, and
the establishment of cultural and economic ties with the Netherlands, Belgium,
and some German Bundesländer also had symbolic implications. The message of-
ten sent to Belgrade was that the issue of autonomy would be brought to the level
of international politics.23 Furthermore, the provincial government initiated sev-
eral measures regarding minority rights, allowing for their implementation more
effectively than in the rest of Serbia, which will be discussed in what follows.
Implementation of Minority Rights in Voivodina
24
The constitution adopted in 1990 under Miloševih deprived Voivodina of its
legislative rights. Until then Voivodina was entitled to adopt its own laws; this
right was withdrawn in 1990. As of November 2006 the new constitution of Ser-
bia did not introduce anything new in this regard either, as it did not extend pro-
vincial competencies as much as an inch.25 Yet as was discussed above, in 2002
the Omnibus Law authorized the Autonomous Province of Voivodina (APV) to
regulate in greater detail some specific areas that fell under provincial jurisdic-
tion, among them the official use of the languages and scripts of national minori-
ties on the territory of APV, including supervision of the regulations’ implemen-
tation.26 As a result, provincial authorities were able to initiate a wide range of
lower level legal measures that ensured more effective implementation of minor-
ity rights in Voivodina than in the rest of Serbia. Some of these positive achieve-
ments, which owed their success in particular to the work of the Provincial Secre-
tariat for Regulations, Administration and National Minorities (practically a min-
istry in the provincial government), will be outlined first. At the same time, I will
stress that despite the proactive attitude of provincial authorities, the existing mi-
nority protection measures have been insufficient to address the inter-ethnic inci-
dents in 2003–2004 and their root causes. In fact, provincial authorities lack the
capacity and the authority to influence the state’s response to such incidents, as
they do not have any control over the work of the police and the judiciary. There-
fore, in the second part of this section the recent inter-ethnic incidents will be dis-
cussed with a view towards possible solutions.
According to law, minorities are entitled to far reaching rights in Serbia, as in-
scribed by the Law on Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities
adopted in February 2002.27 The law originally was legislated at the federal level
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while Serbia was still part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Once the
FRY ceased to exist and was transformed into the state union of Serbia and
Montenegro all federal laws became valid at the republican level of Serbia. The
most important provisions of this law were also enshrined in the new Serbian con-
stitution. This law guaranteed a wide range of rights for national minorities, such
as the right to use their mother tongue, including in official contexts, the right to
preserve minority languages, cultures and national identities, the right to educa-
tion in the mother tongue until high school, the right to use national symbols, the
right to access to public information in minority languages, and the right to appro-
priate representation in the public sector, among others. Moreover, the law of-
fered the possibility for minorities to set up national councils through which they
would be able to exercise their cultural rights. This means that minorities in Serbia
are thus entitled to institutional cultural autonomy:
The persons belonging to national minorities may elect national
councils (hereinafter: the council) with the purpose of exercising
rights of self-government regarding the use of language and script,
education, information and culture.28
The law can be regarded as a good legal basis for minority protection, but im-
plementation often falls short of the rights granted in principle. The reasons for
this are manifold and include shortage of money, harmonization of various laws
regulating specific issues with the law on national minorities, and the absence of
staff that can speak the languages that are official locally. Yet in Voivodina, due to
the activities of the provincial institutions, these rights are exercised more
commonly than in the rest of Serbia.
Language Rights
A recent shadow report prepared by the Voivodina Center for Human Rights
on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of Na-
tional Minorities found that there are considerably better guarantees for language
rights of minorities in Voivodina than in the rest of Serbia.29 The official use of
minority languages is much more common in multi-ethnic municipalities in
Voivodina than in the rest of Serbia.30 In addition to Serbian, Hungarian, Slovak,
Romanian, Ruthenian and Croatian are official on the territory of the province
(and there are several other languages that are official locally).31 According to re-
publican law, the language of a minority becomes official in a municipality if that
minority makes up at least 15% of the population or if the proportion of all na-
tional minorities reaches 10% of the population locally. However, the law also al-
lows municipalities to recognize a language as official if the share of the minority
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group in question does not reach the 15% threshold. Moreover, in Voivodina, due
to provincial regulation, if a minority’s share does not reach the required 15% in a
municipality, but reaches 25% in certain settlements within the municipality, in
those settlements the language of that minority becomes official.32
As the Omnibus Law empowers the province to regulate some issues in detail
in accordance with the relevant republican law,33 the province could also order
and regulate the issuing of bilingual birth certificates. The republican law on offi-
cial language use originally authorizes the relevant ministries of the Serbian gov-
ernment to create such documents. This means that if the ministries fail to do so,
bilingual documents cannot be used, which has been the case outside of Voivo-
dina. Since the ministry of justice and administration never produced such bilin-
gual birth certificates, the Albanians in Preševo valley for instance cannot write
their names in their original form.34 In Voivodina this problem has been solved by
the provincial bodies. Moreover, the Serbian Ministry of Interior issued bilingual
forms of identity cards for some minorities in Voivodina, but not for minorities in
the rest of Serbia.35 In principle, persons belonging to a national minority could
ask for a bilingual form of personal identification, yet these forms were first
printed and made available only in May 2006 and only in Voivodina.
Proportional Representation
A provincial decree declares that public authorities have to take into account
the ethnic make-up of the local population when employing their staff. In order to
support the use of more languages in public institutions, the province is now enti-
tled to issue language certificates proving the language skills of employees. A per-
son knowing more of the official languages of Voivodina is now in an advanta-
geous position when applying for certain jobs in the public sphere. The provincial
bodies also regularly monitor whether national minorities are proportionally rep-
resented in public administration and public companies. Except for the manage-
rial positions of public companies, where Serbs still dominate, with the exception
of the Roma community minorities in general are adequately represented in most
municipal and provincial institutions.
However, while provincial authorities can look after the proportional represen-
tation of national minorities in provincial and municipal institutions, they cannot
oversee republican institutions, where employing persons belonging to national
minorities has not been a priority. Consequently, according to the estimates of the
Provincial Secretariat for Regulations, Administration and National Minorities,
national minorities were the least represented in bodies of the various republican
ministries, such as the police and the judiciary, and in bodies of state administra-
tion managed by districts. As in district branch offices of state authority the ethnic
VOIVODINA’S AUTONOMY AND ITS MINORITY PROTECTION 143
composition of a district is not observed while employing civil servants, minori-
ties practically cannot use their languages while communicating with these state
institutions, hampering the exercise of minority language rights.36 As a result, for
instance, Hungarian is hardly used during court procedures in practice even in
those municipalities in which Hungarians constitute a majority.37 These estimates
are also supported by the table below showing the representation of the Hungarian
minority in judicial institutions and in the bodies of the Ministry of Interior.
Owing to lobbying activities of the provincial government, in 2006 the republi-
can government adopted an action plan aimed at improving the representation of
ethnic minorities in central state institutions operating on the territory of
Voivodina.38 The action plan seeks to increase the share of minorities employed in
such institutions, and until the desired level of representation is reached under-
represented minorities will be subject to positive discrimination. Although the ac-
tion plan reflects the good will of the government, there are no sanctions in the
case of non-compliance. The future success of its implementation is therefore
questionable. Nevertheless, some positive steps were already taken by the police,
reflected by the fact that job advertisements are being publicized in minority lan-
guages as well. Since the police took over border policing from the army, many
new positions were opened, which provides opportunities for persons belonging
to ethnic minorities to enter the police forces. However, a minority-sensitive atti-
tude and a true commitment to proportional representation could be much more
expected if the police and judiciary were under provincial authority.39
Table. Share of Hungarians in the Police and Judicial Bodies in Voivodina40
Population of Voivodina 14.28% (census, 2002)
Judges of municipal court 9.7%
Judges of districts 4.4%
Municipal public prosecutors 8.0%
District public prosecutors 9.3%
Judges of commercial courts 10.2%
Departments of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia
1. Heads of departments and chief superintendents 4.16%
2. Superintendents 8.33%
Political Representation
As was mentioned before, minorities have no guaranteed seats in the govern-
ment or the assembly of the APV. However, parties representing minority groups
can influence politics at the level of the province much more than at the national
level. Today, the parties of the Hungarian Coalition have nine members in the pro-
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vincial assembly and control three secretariats in the executive body. Although no
legal guarantee exists for minority representation in these institutions, it has been
the practice since 2000 to include Hungarian parties in the governing coalitions.
Hungarian ministers control important functions, as they are currently responsible
for the secretariat of national minorities, economy, education. Clearly, their
chances of having an influence in Belgrade are much lower, even if they managed
to send four MPs to the national parliament during the recent elections in 2008.
The significance of participating in the executive bodies can be also demon-
strated through the provincial government’s investment and development policy.
Due to local Hungarians’ political influence, municipalities inhabited by Hungar-
ians receive development funds from the province in accordance with the percent-
age of Hungarians in the population, which they can spend according to their own
priorities.41 Certainly the adoption of this practice can be at least partially ex-
plained by the fact that since 2000 István Pásztor, the current president of the Alli-
ance of Voivodina Hungarians, has been responsible for the ministry of privatiza-
tion, which also manages the allocation of finances from the Voivodina Develop-
ment Fund accumulated from privatization revenues.42
The provincial government’s sensitive attitude to the problems of minorities
was also manifested recently during the process of media privatization. Since the
continued existence of radio and broadcast media in minority languages would
have been threatened by privatization, the Executive Council of the APV
launched an initiative to halt the privatization of multi-lingual radio and television
stations.43 As the state decided that all print media had to be privatized, the owner-
ship of minority print media was transferred from the province to the national
councils. Yet as the financing of these newspapers and magazines remained unre-
solved, the province continued to contribute significantly to the maintenance of
these forums from its own budget.44
National Councils
Recently, the provincial national council was established, including the direc-
tors of all national councils and provincial ministers. The function of such a body
will be to provide a forum where representatives of national councils can discuss
all issues related to national minorities with the ministers, initiate proposals, and
give opinions about legal proposals. Provincial bodies in general closely cooper-
ate with national councils and involve them in decision making related to national
minorities. For instance, the province consults the national councils on the ques-
tion of which cultural institutions of national minorities should be supported and
how much funding they should receive.
VOIVODINA’S AUTONOMY AND ITS MINORITY PROTECTION 145
It can be also argued that the institutional development of the Hungarian Na-
tional Council has been the outcome of close cooperation between Hungarian pol-
iticians of Voivodina and the provincial government.45 This has been the case on
the one hand because many key figures in Voivodina’s government personally
played an active role in establishing the Council, such as Tamás Korhecz, Provin-
cial Secretary of Regulation, Administration, and National Minorities and István
Pásztor, Provincial Secretary of Privatization. On the other hand, many compe-
tencies bestowed on the Council used to belong to provincial jurisdiction. Endow-
ing the Council with real powers has been a long process that has been underway
since its founding in 2002, while its authority has been extended over more areas
gradually. Giving real clout to the Council involved extensive negotiations with
the central government and provincial authorities, thus what has been achieved so
far can be considered a result of an extensive bargaining process. Even today the
Council’s powers are not defined by law, as the Law on Protection of Rights and
Freedoms of National Minorities only states that the council “shall participate in
decision making or decide on issues in these fields [the use of language and script,
education, information and culture]”.46 This means that the law determines the
competencies of national councils only approximately; moreover, it proposes
only temporary rules concerning the councils’ election. Therefore, a fundamental
aspiration of the Hungarian members of parliament in Belgrade is to determine
clearly the national councils’ spheres of authority through legislation.47 They also
want to set the financing of the councils’ programs aiming at the preservation of
national identity on a sound legal basis. Currently, only the operating costs of the
Hungarian National Council are fully covered by the state and province, the pro-
grams it runs are not.48 In addition, the election procedure of the council members
has to be clearly spelled out by law. This law is still waiting to be adopted, even
though the current term of the Hungarian National Council already expired in De-
cember 2006.49
One area in which the Hungarian National Council is already in the process of
gaining more authority is minority education. According to law, national minori-
ties can exercise authority over minority education through their national coun-
cils, yet this field used to be under provincial authority.50 In Voivodina ultimately
the province has the authority to pass curricula for minorities and approve text-
books in agreement with the Ministry of Education, while in the rest of the coun-
try passing curricula and approving textbooks is solely the responsibility of the
central government.51 In cooperation with the provincial government, the Hun-
garian National Council has been slowly taking control over Hungarian minority
education over the last few years. By now the Council has to be consulted on mat-
ters such as the selection of school directors or members of school boards in those
institutions where Hungarian is among the languages of instruction.52 Moreover,
the Hungarian National Council has been taking an active part in designing Hun-
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garian educational curricula, including choosing textbooks, which are often im-
ported from Hungary.53 The ultimate aspiration of the Hungarian minority, repre-
sented by the National Council, is to gain full authority over the schools in which
instruction is exclusively in Hungarian and to run their own Hungarian school net-
work.54
The Incidents
Despite all the minority protection efforts of the provincial government, ethni-
cally motivated violence was on the rise in 2003 and 2004. This coincided with
the electoral success of the Serbian Radical Party, having gained the highest share
of votes in Voivodina during the 2003 parliamentary and the 2004 local elections.
In 2003 the minority government led by Vojislav Koštunica was formed with the
outside support of the Serbian Socialist Party. These political developments rep-
resented a nationalist turn after the four year rule of the Ðinðih (after March 2003
the ivkovih) government and were somewhat surprising considering that during
the 1990s Voivodina was mostly spared from ethnic violence.54 Nevertheless, the
share of ethnic minorities significantly decreased over the course of the decade
due to their mass emigration and the large influx of Serbian refugees. Some
172,000 Serbs from other parts of Yugoslavia settled in Voivodina permanently,
while the population of the three largest minorities (Hungarians, Slovaks, and
Croats) declined significantly. Between 1991 and 2002, the proportion of Hun-
garians in the population of the province fell from 17% to 14%, partially due to the
emigration of tens of thousands.55 Altogether, the share of Serbs climbed from
57% in 1991 to 65% in 2002, which was a sign of Voivodina’s weakening multi-
ethnic character.56
Various organizations presented different numbers of incidents, reflecting not
only their divergent political leanings but also the difficulty of defining what ex-
actly can be called an incident. The Provincial Secretariat for Regulations, Ad-
ministration and National Minorities recorded 206 incidents between December
2003 and November 2004.57 The Ombudsman for Voivodina counted 76 inci-
dents between January and September 2004.
The incidents included nationalist graffiti, damaging objects of symbolic value
to religious or ethnic minorities, damaging private property, verbal attacks, physi-
cal attacks and fights. It should be stressed that only a minority of the incidents in-
cluded violence against individuals, and no one was killed. However, the inci-
dents cannot be regarded as being only isolated cases, but were part of a wide-
spread phenomenon in Voivodina. The victims were persons belonging to na-
tional minorities, the majority of them ethnic Hungarians. Most of the perpetrators
were young people between the ages of 15 and 25, and they acted mostly sponta-
neously.58
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As was concluded by a study prepared by Florian Bieber and Jenni Winter-
hagen, this upsurge of violence can be associated with the alarming distance be-
tween ethnic groups and the high ethnocentrism of youth. They further argued that
the incidents reflected deeper inter-ethnic divides and “a new form of grassroots
nationalism,” which if it goes unaddressed may lead to new waves of ethnic ten-
sion and may “radicalize the political scene.”59 Thus, the incidents revealed
deeper social problems that were aggravated by the nationalist backlash at the
center in Belgrade and the nationalist attitude of the media.
The weak response of the police until October 2004, marked by the low num-
ber of perpetrators arrested and by light sentences, indicated the attitude of central
authorities, who did not see the resolution of this problem as a priority. Interna-
tional attention was needed for central authorities to take firm action, after which
the frequency of incidents dropped sharply.60
The incidents were much politicized within and outside of Serbia. The rhetoric
of the biggest Hungarian party, the Alliance of Voivodina Hungarians (AVH), be-
came increasingly dominated by the incidents carried out against Hungarian indi-
viduals. Owing to the intense propaganda of the Hungarian parties, the Hungarian
government also got extensively involved, and after it failed to address the issue
on a bilateral level with Serbia and the state union it turned to the EU and the
Council of Europe.61 As a result, the Council of Europe raised its voice several
times in 2004 against the violence in Voivodina.62 Moreover, in a resolution
drafted by its Hungarian members, the European Parliament condemned the vio-
lence and called for the restoration of Voivodina’s pre-1990 autonomy in Septem-
ber 2005. The resolution reflected the view according to which central authorities
mostly ignored the incidents and failed to react properly, thus demanding on this
basis more autonomy for Voivodina.63
The Serbian media initially generally ignored the problem and hardly reported
it. This was true even of the regional media in Voivodina, such as Dnevnik. After
the issue attracted international attention local media began to blame the Hungar-
ian party and Nenad Canak, a prominent Serbian autonomist politician, for incit-
ing inter-ethnic tensions.64 Until the fall of 2004, Belgrade officials mostly denied
the ethnic character of the violence and questioned its significance by making ref-
erences to the young age of the perpetrators. Altogether the government has been
slow and reluctant to react, which has contributed indirectly to the escalation of
violence. The number of cases noticeably decreased after the government put
some pressure on the police to respond more firmly, which also brought about an
increase in judicial procedures.65 According to the data of Ministry of Human and
Minority Rights, incidents targeting ethnic Hungarians significantly decreased in
2005, yet the level of incidents was still higher than in 2003.66
In recognition of the fact that the weak response of the judiciary and police was
at least part of the cause of the escalation of violence, the need to have some sort of
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local influence over the selection of the heads of police, judges and prosecutors
was brought up by the AVH and by Nenad Canak, as well as the need to create a
multiethnic police in Voivodina.67 One can conclude, in agreement with Bieber
and Winterhagen, that the initial weak state reaction to inter-ethnic violence re-
flected a general skepticism towards minorities and a lack of sensitivity to their
problems. At the same time, since 2000 provincial authorities have demonstrated
a very different attitude and testified to a true commitment to minority related is-
sues. This is also a consequence of the fact that politicians belonging to ethnic mi-
norities, especially Hungarians, have actively participated in their work. Recog-
nizing that the incidents reflected deeper social problems, in 2005 the Provincial
Secretariat for Regulations, Administration and National Minorities initiated a
project promoting multiculturalism and tolerance and targeting young people.68
The program was not supported by republican institutions, but it did receive fund-
ing from the Hungarian government, the OSCE mission, the US embassy and a
private company. While more of such programs would be needed to reduce the
distance between ethnic communities in Voivodina and to improve the level of
personal inter-ethnic contacts, delegating the police and the judiciary to provin-
cial authority could be a guarantee of a more minority-friendly response to future
inter-ethnic tensions in light of the past performance of provincial institutions.
Conclusion
Although several opinion polls testify to the fact that the majority of Voivo-
dina’s citizens would be in favor of autonomy, the movement for autonomy has
remained insignificant and has not been able to mobilize considerable support.69
After 2000 the autonomist parties could not use the political leverage they gained
during the September 2000 elections and they gradually became marginalized.
Their shrinking popularity can be explained by several factors. First of all, they
were not in a position to restore Voivodina’s autonomy, as such decisions have to
be made by the republican parliament. However, their inability to gain electoral
support was mostly the result of their political behavior. Since the early nineties
there was no single election during which the parties representing Voivodina’s au-
tonomy would have been unified. The coalitions they joined revealed their priori-
ties. This communicated to the public that even for autonomist parties the issue of
autonomy was not of the highest importance. Moreover, the negative campaign
against one another and Belgrade probably further weakened their popularity.
At the same time, Belgrade has also been reluctant to grant the autonomy it
promised in 2000. The current powers of provincial institutions have been suffi-
cient to implement minority rights more effectively in Voivodina than in the rest
of Serbia, yet were not enough to prevent inter-ethnic incidents. It can be assumed
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that were Voivodina to have more powers, coupled with the necessary financial
autonomy, this would benefit minority groups. Proportional representation in
public institutions could be implemented on a wider scale, extending to institu-
tions currently under central control. Bringing the judiciary and the police under
regional authority could reduce the chances of inter-ethnic incidents and could
ease inter-ethnic tensions. More money could be spent not only on minority edu-
cation and culture, but on programs fostering inter-ethnic coexistence. Last but
not least, more financial autonomy could contribute to more efficient economic
development.
It is worth noting that the pro-autonomy agenda has always been part of a
pro-European, democratic discourse. In addition to the autonomist parties and the
young but small Liberal Democratic Party of Cedomir Jovanovih, there is also a
faction in the Democratic Party that supports Voivodina’s autonomy. They have
not been too outspoken recently, probably because the present moment is not the
right one in which to push such agendas due to the issue of Kosovo. However, if
Voivodina’s autonomy would be taken up by any significant political party in the
future, the EU should encourage such an endeavor. Granting support for political
forces fighting for Voivodina’s autonomy would not only constitute a sign of sup-
port for national minorities but could potentially reinforce a more democratic,
pro-EU identity for Serbia. As the EU needs allies in Serbia in order to bring Ser-
bia into its ranks, autonomist forces could be such partners during the process of
Serbia’s accession.
The elections held in May 2008 in Serbia brought about a further weakening of
autonomist forces in Voivodina. The Hungarian Coalition managed to secure only
nine mandates as opposed to its previous eleven, while the number of seats held by
the Together for Voivodina coalition in the provincial parliament dropped from
seven to six. The true winner was the Democratic Party, as its coalition, “For a Eu-
ropean Voivodina,” controls the absolute majority of seats in the assembly (64 of
120). Even if part of the Democratic Party supports Voivodina’s autonomy, it fun-
damentally won the elections on the democratic ticket, not on the issue of auton-
omy, as it positioned itself as the guardian of democracy in the face of the threat
posed by the Serbian Radical Party. Consequently, its overwhelming success can
be interpreted as a popular vote for democracy and Serbia’s European future,
while people were probably less influenced by concerns over autonomy.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Democratic Party could comfortably
form a government on its own, it decided to include the Hungarians and the LSDV
in the ruling coalition alongside the Serbian Socialist Party, which became its
partner at the national level. Consequently, in spite of the Hungarians’ weakening
political weight indicated by their poor performance in the provincial elections,
AVH managed to keep its strong position in the province’s institutions, which is a
promising sign that it will be able to uphold Hungarian interests through the next
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political term. The most curial posts from the Hungarian minority’s point of view,
the ministries of economy, minorities and education, were retained by the party.
Moreover, AVH nominated the president of Voivodina’s assembly.70 Thus there
is a good chance for the continuation of institution building and the assertion of
minority rights, even if the number of Hungarians in the provincial parliament de-
creased by two. A recent communication of the newly formed provincial govern-
ment also indicates that its former sensitivity to minority issues and its increased
attention to minority rights will be sustained in the future. At the end of July, the
government concluded that the implementation of the law on minority languages
in local administrative and judicial bodies was unsatisfactory and called on local
governments to take decisive steps in order to ensure that minority languages
could be used more widely in practice.71 In addition, the fact that Tamás Korhecz
kept the office of the Secretariat for Regulations, Administration and National
Minorities is a further guarantee that the existing policies related to minority pro-
tection will be maintained.
Finally, the new provincial government can be expected to continue the strug-
gle to strengthen Voivodina’s autonomy, as Bojan Pajtih, an enthusiastic autono-
mist of the Democratic Party, has again become prime minister. Due to the gov-
erning coalition’s overwhelming weight in the provincial assembly, it will be easy
for them to pursue their political agenda. Yet ultimately the key to their success
lies more in Belgrade than in Novi Sad, as the national assembly has the authority
to expand Voivodina’s jurisdiction over more areas and to grant it financial auton-
omy. The implementation of minority rights depends also on Belgrade to a con-
siderable extent, since for the proper functioning of national councils the Serbian
parliament has to adopt the necessary laws, such as those regulating the election of
national councils and the financing of their programs. Therefore, power relations
in the Serbian parliament will fundamentally determine what can be achieved in
terms of asserting minority rights and further developing Voivodina’s autonomy.
Since the Democratic Party at the head of the Serbian government does not have
to prove its democratic credentials, there is a fear that as during the previous pe-
riod it will not view these issues as a priority. In this respect it was probably a wise
decision on the part of the Hungarian Coalition not to join the government but to
support it from the outside. This might secure the four Hungarian deputies a better
position from which to represent Hungarian interests and push through their
political agendas.
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